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A Proposal for National Uniform
Art-Proceeds Legislation
Art-proceeds legislation allows the artist to receive a portion of the profit
upon each resale of his work. The movement for such legislation is growing
out of an increasing recognition by artists and their supporters of the need to
protect the right to share in profits resulting from the reputation of the
creator of the work; as an artist's work gains recognition it can be sold for in-
creasingly higher prices and although the profit realized on each resale is due
to the artist's growing reputation, it is enjoyed only by the seller. This
misallocation of profit is remedied by allowing a percentage of the proceeds
to flow to the artist upon each resale of his work. Art-proceeds legislation,
statutorily mandating what percentage of profit should be reallocated to the
artist and under what terms and conditions, has recently gone into effect in
California. Such legislation could possibly serve as a model for other states to
adopt.
This note analyzes the rationale behind art-proceeds legislation, reviews
the problems which such innovative legislation creates and examines the
desirability of an expansion of this type of legislation on a national level.
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PRECEDENT
Art-proceeds legislation has long been in existence in Europe.' The right
to receive art-proceeds could be considered a corollary of the well-established
moral rights doctrine2 since it protects the pecuniary rather than the moral
rights of the creator3 in his intellectual property. The rationale behind art-
proceeds legislation varies in the different European countries where it is
recognized. Legislation in France, Germany and Belgium represent the three
major theories.
In France the droit de suite4 is considered an extension of the artist's
right to be protected by copyright. 5 The theory supporting the droit de suite
'See Sherman, Incorporation of the Droit de Suite into United States Copyright Law, 18
ASCAP COPYRIGrr L. SYMP. 50, 54-56 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sherman].
'The bundle of rights usually held to be within the moral rights doctrine includes: the
right of disclosure of a piece, the right of withdrawal, the right of paternity and the right of in-
tegrity of the piece. Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors & Artists Under
French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 467 (1968).
'See Monta, The Concept of "Copyright" Versus the "Droit d'Auteur", 32 S. CAL. L. REv.
177, 183 (1959).
4Droit de Suite is roughly translated "follow-up right," the French equivalent of our art-
proceeds right or resale royalties right.
'Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed Enactment for
the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 19, 24 (1966).
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is that the artist should receive payment commensurate with the use made of
his creation. 6 Droit de suite, comparable to a rental payment, accomplishes
this because the author is paid for the use of his work whether or not it has
increased in value at the time of resale.
In Germany art-proceeds legislation is based on recognition of the latent
value in a piece of work.7 Fairness is achieved by allowing an artist to par-
ticipate in profits which arise later in the life of the piece, the theory being
that the potential for such profit existed from the moment of creation.
8
By contrast, the Belgian theory is analogous to the American contract
principles of changed circumstances and unjust enrichment.9 Under the doc-
trine of changed circumstances, the parties may revise the terms of a contract
under which performance would cause hardship for one of the parties; the ar-
tist is allowed to collect subsequent profits in order to effectively revise the
original contract to account for the increase in the value of a piece from its
original sale price. Under the unjust enrichment theory there is a continuing
relationship between the artist and those who purchase his work which is
traceable to the growing reputation of the artist; the artist is compensated for
the profits which arise due to his reputation, thereby preventing subsequent
purchasers from being unjustly enriched.' 0
Although artists' moral rights have never been explicitly recognized in the
United States," there is precedent in many areas of American law which, by
analogy, lays a foundation for art-proceeds legislation.1 2 Support can be
drawn from contract 3 and property law concepts,1 4 as well as the doctrines of
libel, unfair competition, copyright and the right of privacy. 15 Under all of
these theories intellectual property is legally protected from exploitation,
distortion or intrusion by another. Similarly, art-proceeds legislation protects
the artist's intellectual property against economic exploitation by the seller.
Another possible basis for art-proceeds legislation is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to which the United States is a signatory. Arti-
cle 27(2) recognizes an author's moral rights. 16 This provision reads:
Everyone has the right to protection of the moral and material interests
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the
author.
sId.
7Sherman, supra note 1, at 59.
8Id.
9Id.
101d.
1E. KINTNER & J. LAHIt, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw PRIMER 555 (1975).
"2Note, Moral Right in the United States, 55 CONN. B.J. 509, 515-16 (1961).
"See Sherman, supra note 1, at 59.
"Strong, Artists' Property Rights, in ART LAW 47 (L. Duboff ed. 1975).
5Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 55 HARV. L. REV. 554, 578 (1940). Roeder, however, does not feel these doctrines offer
adequate support.
"Ratified by the United States, Dec. 10, 1948 (1 U.N. Bulletin § 6, at 6, 8 (Jan. 1. 1949)).
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Many policies of American law also support the artist's right to subse-
quent profits. Like consumer protection legislation, art-proceeds legislation is
designed to protect an element of society which deserves protection but may
not have the economic strength to protect itself. Other creators in American
society, such as authors and composers, receive royalties for their works, and
the graphic artist deserves the same protection.1 7 Art-proceeds legislation pro-
vides an economic incentive to artists which will benefit the public by spur-
ring more art production.1 8 Ultimately it does not matter whether art-
proceeds legislation is justified as a natural right or as a form of pecuniary
protection;19 the right should not be denied recognition for lack of an ap-
propriate label.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ART-PROCEEDS LEGISLATION
The desirability of art-proceeds legislation is not universally accepted.
Five major arguments often raised against it are: (1) that it conflicts with
basic concepts in American property and contract law; (2) that it will hinder
the art market; (3) that the "wrong" artists will benefit; (4) that it is chauvi-
nistic, elitist legislation because it applies only to classical art forms and (5)
that the amounts which will be collected are too insignificant to merit
legislative action.
The contention that art-proceeds legislation conflicts with property and
contract law tenets is based on the American concept of ownership under
which the owner has complete rights in the property, including the right to
receive all profits upon disposal. But there is room within this ownership
framework for art-proceeds legislation. As previously noted, art-proceeds
legislation provides a pecuniary reservation analogous to royalty rights of
authors and composers.20 In many other aspects of American law private
property rights are also subjected to legislative limitations 1 not unlike the
limitation art-proceeds legislation would impose upon an art owner at the
time of resale.2 "
'Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed Enactment for
the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 25 (1966).
"Sherman, supra note 1, at 57.
"Cf Hepp, Royalties from Works of the Fine Arts: Origin of the Concept of Droit de Suite
in Copyright Law, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 91 (1958) (Hepp applies this reasoning to copyright
protection).
'
5 Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprizileged
Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 26 (1962).
21Id.
2t Many states have incorporated into their property statutes the Rule Against Perpetuities
which holds that no interest, other than one in the grantor-testator, is good unless it must vest or
fail to vest (if it is a remainder), or become possessory or fail to become possessory (if it is an ex-
ecutory interest), if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest. E.g., IND. CODE § 32-1-4-1 (1976).
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Critics who claim art-proceeds legislation will hinder the art market ' s
argue that potential buyers will be deterred by the prospect of having to give
up a percentage of future profits and will invest instead in commodities, such
as antiques, which are not subject to art-proceeds restrictions. This argument
ignores the fact that art-proceeds legislation will not have sufficient monetary
or administrative effect to dissuade the art lover from purchasing art.2 ' In
fact, many purchasers may be pleased to compensate the artist with a percen-
tage of profit.2 Although those purchasers who buy art more as an invest-
ment than for love of the piece may invest in other commodities, the number
so shifting should not cause the art market to shrink. Furthermore, any disad-
vantage to artists due to diminution of the art market must be balanced
against the expected gain from art-proceeds legislation; it is probable that in
the long run the artist will benefit more by receiving a portion of resale pro-
fits than he will suffer by losing a potential buyer.
Critics also contend that the "wrong" artists will benefit from such legisla-
tion since art-proceeds will only benefit well-known artists whose works sell at
high prices, instead of the struggling artists who need economic incentive.26
This argument perpetuates the stereotyped image of the starving artist by
refusing to concede that a good artist who is also a good businessman should
be rewarded. An artist is not less entitled to receive the benefits of art-
proceeds legislation merely because he is financially successful; indeed the
financially successful artist may be more deserving of such benefits since his
work sells for increasingly higher prices in which he does not share.2 7
European art-proceeds laws apply only to classical art forms; such legisla-
tion has been criticized as chauvinistic and elitist because it does not apply to
such art forms as conceptual art, jewelry, architecture and carpentry.28
However, unlike the artisan who receives adequate compensation at the first
sale of the item he produces,29 the author of fine art is often forced to sell his
work at a price which does not adequately compensate him for labor or
materials.8 0 Art-proceeds legislation remedies this discrepancy by recognizing
the potential value in a piece which exists at the time of the original sale.
23See, e.g., Price, Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the
Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.J. 1333, 1352 n.52 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Price].
'4See Sherman, supra note 1, at 53.8 Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed Enactment for
the United States, 61 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 19, 43 (1966).
"Price, supra note 23, at 1366.
"For example, well-known artist Robert Rauschenberg sold his collage "Thaw" to collector
Robert Schull in the 1950's for $800.00. Schull later auctioned the piece for $85,000.00.
Chamberlain, Artists' Royalty Agreement, 38 AM. AsTsT 45 (May 1974).
8Vail, Droit de Suite, in ART LAW 45, 46 (L. Duboff ed. 1975).
"Strong, Comments on Droit Moral, in ART LAw 69 (L. Duboff ed. 1975).
"
0The conceptual artist, dealing in a perishable medium, realizes thd monetary limitations
of his art. He does not expect to profit over the years from a piece which will disintegrate within
a day or an hour.
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A final criticism of art-proceeds legislation is that its effect is minimal
and therefore does not warrant legislative mandate. This criticism recognizes
the changing nature of the art market; resales are less frequent as institu-
tional, corporate and municipal buyers increase, and production of originals
is becoming less frequent as the market for reproductions increases.3 1 But the
philosophy of art-proceeds legislation is not defeated by the art market transi-
tion. If a piece is never resold no one profits from the artist's original creativi-
ty; if the piece is resold, art-proceeds legislation justly reimburses the artist
for the economic exploitation of his original creativity 2 even if such reim-
bursement is only a modest sum.
THE CALIFORNIA ART-PROCEEDS ACT
California recently enacted the Resale Royalties Act, 3 the first art-
proceeds statute enacted in the United States.3' The California Resale
Royalties Act applies whenever a work of fine art3 5 is sold in California or
when the seller resides in California.36 Under the Act, the artist receives from
the seller five percent of the total sales price of the work,3 7 which is to be
paid to the artist or artist's agent within ninety days of the sale, the responsi-
bility for locating the artist resting on the seller or seller's agent.3s If the artist
is not located, the money is deposited by the California Arts Council in a
"Special Deposit Fund" in the State Treasury where it may be claimed by the
artist any time within seven years of the sale, after which time the money goes
into an operating fund which supports Council programs.3 9 The five percent
royalty right is non-transferable and non-waivable by the artist, except by
contract providing for a royalty of greater than five percent.
4 0
The Act is not all encompassing, however; it extends only to works of fine
art and does not apply to the initial sale of a work of fine art if the artist has
title to the piece at the time of the sale, to the resale of a work for a gross
sales price of less than $1,000, to resale after the artist's death, to resale for a
gross sales price less than the purchase price paid by the seller, or where there
is a transfer or exchange involving a work of fine art with a fair market value
of less than $1,000.41
lPrice, supra note 23, at 1342.
"Hauser, The French Drot de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underpriileged
Artist Under the Copyright Law, 11 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 25 (1962).
"3CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1976).
""Resale Royalties" is synonomous with art-proceeds, the term used in this article.
"5A work of "Fine art" means an original painting, sculpture or drawing. CAL. CIv. CODE §
986(c)(2) (West 1976).
"Id. § 986(a).
7id.
"Id. § 986(a)(2) and (3).
"Id. § 986(a)(4) and (5).
40Id. § 986(a). This provision is intended to prevent pressure by an art dealer on artists in
economically weak bargaining positions.
. . 41Id. § 986(b).
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The California Act should be characterized as a statutory enactment to
protect an artist's property right rather than as an attempt to provide
economic support for artists. Viewed as an economic support measure the bill
would be a failure since five percent is monetarily very little in terms of
resale, most art works are not resold with significant frequency, and a majori-
ty of artists are not selling works in the $1,000-and-up price bracket. As a
protection of property rights, however, the bill has merit. The right being
protected is the property owner's right to benefit from the sale of his prop-
erty, the property being protected is the artist's reputation, and the protec-
tion afforded is a five percent royalty. This analysis requires conceputalizing
the payment received for a work of art in two parts: the amount allocable to
the physical item and the amount allocable to the artist's reputation. Since it
is impossible to determine what amount of the sale price the buyer would at-
tribute to each of the two parts, setting a predetermined amount as a royalty
payment is the only way to guarantee protection of the artist's art-proceeds
right.
EXPANSION OF ART-PROCEEDS PROTECTION
Assuming the desirability of protecting artists' rights to a portion of
subsequent profits, two critical issues arise: (1) should such protection be af-
forded through legislation? and (2) if so, should such legislation be enacted at
the federal or the state level?
The only real alternative to art-proceeds legislation is a private contrac-
tual agreement between the parties to an art transfer. 42 The advantage of
such an alternative is the flexibility it offers. The artist and purchaser can
negotiate and agree upon provisions guaranteeing the artist's rights to super-
vise future repair of the work, to have a say in how the work is displayed, or
to repossess the work for brief intervals to set up a private show. The artist
could also use a contractual agreement to reserve reproduction rights. But the
art contract is not responsive to the serious problem of an artist's often weak
economic bargaining position. 43 Many artists do not feel they are in a position
to risk losing a sale by insisting upon an art-proceeds arrangement with a
potential purchaser. Even if artists are in a position to negotiate fair contract
terms with the first purchaser, there is no guarantee that subsequent pur-
chasers will send the "transfer form"44 to the artist upon resale or, if they do
send it, that they will not falsify the values reported to the artist. Indeed,
California's art-proceeds legislation was enacted in recognition of the ob-
42The Projansky Agreement, the most well-known example of a work-of-art contract, con-
tains nineteen articles protecting the artist's rights upon the first and subsequent transfers of the
work. It is reprinted in 181 Studio International 186 (April 1971).
4"Hughes, "A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists," in TIME, Mar. 11, 1974, at 65.
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solescence of a freedom-of-contract argument in today's art community. 45
Art-proceeds legislation on a national scale would mark the ultimate success
of California's Act.4 6 This could be achieved either at the federal level
through amendment of the Copyright Revision Act, or at the state level
through passage of a national Uniform Act.
47
The present Copyright Revision Act could be easily amended to include
art-proceeds protection by qualifying the resale right of an art owner. 4 8 The
affinity between art-proceeds protection and copyright protection, which
raises a federal preemption issue,49 attests to the fact that such a qualification
would not abrogate the purposes of copyright; the preemption issue would
not arise if copyright legislation and art-proceeds legislation were not
arguably similar in scope and purpose. Realistically however, it does not ap-
pear likely that the Copyright Act will be revised to include art-proceeds
legislation within the near future.5 0
Alternatively, enactment of national uniform legislation is the preferable
approach to protection of the artist's rights. Although the art market in the
United States is of a national character, art-proceeds legislation is more
suitably enacted at the state level since regulation of pecuniary rights of
citizens is not traditionally an area of federal concern. Art-proceeds legisla-
tion standing alone in one state however, is seriously weakened by problems
of evasion and enforcement which would be solved by national uniformity.
Thus, a National Uniform Art-Proceeds Act, despite being a piecemeal pro-
cess of achieving national uniformity, is ultimately a faster alternative than to
await passage of federal art-proceeds legislation. States having a larger art
community would be likely to enact art-proceeds legislation sooner than
others, but eventually the possibility of evading payment by selling outside an
art-proceeds state would be eliminated as each state adopted uniform legisla-
tion.
Although state-by-state enactment of national uniform art-proceeds
legislation will inevitably be a long process, there is a great deal which can be
done in the meantime. In addition to lobbying for legislation, an artists'
organizations ' could lay the ground work to prepare the art community of
"See also Drachsler & Torczyner, Fake Paintings in America-A Judicial Still Life of the
Moral Right Doctrine, in FORGERY IN ART & THE LAw 50 (M. Drachsler & H. Torczyner eds.
1956).
"M. PRICE & H. SANDISON, A GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTIES ACr 3 (1976).
'
TGorewitz, Artists' Royalties: Should There be a Law, 62 ART. IN AMERIcA 22 (Mar.-Apr.
1974).
"Sherman, supra note 1, at 85, 91.
"See notes 51-67 infra.
sSee 2 LINDEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS; AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW
505 (1977 Cum. Supp.). It should be noted, however, that the Carter Administration has shown
an interest in art-proceeds legislation, and a Beverly Hills Congressman, Representative Henry
Waxman, has announced plans to introduce a royalties measure to Congress this year [1977].
"See Boyer, Protection for the Artist: The Alternatives, 21 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
124. 129 (1974).
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each state for such legislation. Two aspects of this groundwork might be the
establishment of an art registration system5 2 and the education of the art
community,"5 which would benefit artists and art investors by making them
better informed about the business aspects of the art world.
In light of the desirability of national uniform legislation, two factors
should be examined in evaluating whether the California Act should serve as
a model for national uniform art-proceeds legislation: the possibility of
federal preemption of the act, and the administrability of such an Act.
Federal Preemption
California's art-proceeds act faces a significant constitutional issue of
preemption as a result of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976.54 The new
Copyright Act, effective January 1, 1978, contains a federal preemption
clause. This clause provides that state laws governing any legal or equitable
rights which come within the subject matter of copyright and are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights protected by copyright are preempted by the
Copyright Revision Act.5s If the art-proceeds right protected by California's
Act is within the subject matter of copyright and is "equivalent" to any of the
exclusive rights protected by copyright, it is thereby preempted by the
Copyright Act.
The subject matter protected by the Copyright Revision Act includes
original pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, 56 so that fine art, as defined
by the California Act, clearly falls within the subject matter of copyright.5 7
The more difficult question is whether the art-proceeds right is "equivalent"
B2See Rie, Legal Rights of the Artist, The Droit de Suite, 20 ART. J. 152 (1961).
53Price, supra note 23, at 1364.54Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, to be codified as 17
U.S.C. § 101-810 [hereinafter cited as Copyright Act].
"Copyright Act § 301.
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by Section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and
come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by Sections 102 and 103,
whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any state.
Id. § 301(a).
5 Copyright Act § 102.
Subject matter of copyright: In general
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories: . ...
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works . ...
d. 57CAL. Civ. CODE § 986(c)(2) (West 1976).
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to any of the exclusive rights protected by the Copyright Revision Act. These
exclusive rights include the right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease or
lending. 8 The term "copies" as defined by the Copyright Revision Act in-
cludes "the material object . . . in which the work is first fixed," thereby en-
compassing an original work of art. 6
Technically, then, the art-proceeds right appears to fall within the scope
of copyright, since resale is a form of distribution and a copy is defined in the
Copyright Revision Act to include an original. 60 Both resale and reproduction
are forms of art dissemination. By reproducing and distributing a piece of art
an owner is economically exploiting the original creativity of the artist; the
same is true when an owner resells a piece of'art. Reproduction and resale
are two of the many possible commercial uses of a piece of art. 61 Thus,
copyright and art-proceeds rights are arguably equivalent since both protect
the continuing economic rights which an artist has in his work against com-
mercial use without compensation.6
Nevertheless, the applicability of the federal preemption clause to state
art-proceeds legislation should be rejected. Neither the substance of copyright
legislation, nor the history of its application, indicate any protection of rights
in profits on subsequent resales of property.63 The conformity between the
art-proceeds right and copyright is linguistic only; even though both protect
pecuniary aspects of property ownership, they are qualitatively different. Art-
proceeds legislation protects the financial right to participate in profits from
the property, while copyright protects the right to control usage of property
for purposes of reproduction of copies. The distinction is analogous to that
between the right of a property owner to receive rent from a tenant and his
right to control trespass; both are property rights but they are not equivalent
since the former is a financial right protected by contract law and the latter
is a usage right protected by tort law. The fact that art-proceeds legislation
applies only to originals and is not concerned with reproductions brings it
"
8Copyright Act § 106(3).
Exclusive rights in copyrighted works
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ....
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending ....
Id.
sgCopyright Act § 101.
EoId.
1Telephone interview with Hamish Sandison, Executive Director,, Bay Area Lawyers for the
Arts, Inc. (Mar. 24, 1977).
"lNote, Moral Rights in the United States, 35 CONN. B.J. 509 (1961).
'Carroll, Statutory Copyright-A Valuable Right for the Visual Artist, 20 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 316, 317 (1973); Chisum, Copyright Law and the Artist, in ART LAw 119, 120
(L. Duboff ed. 1975).
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closer to a regulation of property rights in an article of interstate commerce
than to a form of copyright protection.
s4
The legislative history of the Copyright Revision Act also supports the
argument against federal preemption.6" The federal preemption clause seeks
to abolish the dual system of common law and statutory copyright 66 and to
prevent intrusion by the states into this area of federal regulation. Its purpose
is to eliminate the uncertainties and complications which result from the
regulation of the same matter by both state and federal law and to prevent
any obstruction of the objectives of federal copyright protection in promoting
writing and scholarship.67 Legislation modelled on the California Act would
neither interfere with the desirable uniformity of copyright protection nor
obstruct any objectives of copyright. The purpose of art-proceeds legislation
coincides with the purpose of copyright legislation in spurring creativity.
Moreover, federal preemption has not operated to the detriment of state
regulation in other areas of the law, such as patents and trademarks. 68
The strongest argument against federal preemption stems from § 109 of
the Copyright Revision Act,69 limiting the exclusive rights protected by
copyright. This section limits the exclusiveness of a creator's distribution right
"Sherman, supra note 1, at 82.
5U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2541-602.
"The intention of section 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the com-
mon law or statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to
works coming within the scope of the Federal copyright law. The declaration of this
principle in section 301 is intended to be stated in the clearest and most unequivocal
language possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable misinterpretation of its unquali-
fied intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and to avoid the development of
any vague borderline areas between State and Federal protection.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 5659, 5746.
O'By substituting a single Federal system for the present anachronistic, uncertain,
impractical, and highly complicated dual system, the bill would greatly improve the
operation of the copyright law and would be much more effective in carrying out the
basic constitutional aims of uniformity and the promotion of writing and scholarship.
Id. at 5745.
"See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), wherein the Supreme
Court held Ohio's trade secret law was not preempted by the federal patent laws. The Court
specified that the States are free to regulate intellectual property rights, such as trade secrets and
writings, the only limitation being that regulation in the area of patents and copyrights must not
conflict with the operation of federal laws in this area. The Court reasoned that the federal pa-
tent policy of encouraging invention was not disturbed by the existence of another form of incen-
tive to invention such as trade secret protection and therefore the state and federal systems were
not in conflict. A further rationale for the Court's decision was the fact that trade secret law,
since it affords weaker protection than the patent laws, presents no reasonable risk of deterrence
from patent application. The same reasoning is applicable to the issue of possible conflict be-
tween federal copyright and state art-proceeds legislation: Art-proceeds legislation acts as another
form of incentive to creativity in addition to copyright legislation. Also, art-proceeds legislation is
narrower in scope than copyright legislation since art proceeds, at least under the California Act,
covers only sales, and not rentals, gifts or loans, whereas the Copyright Act applies to distribution
by sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease, or lending. See CAL. Civ. CODE §
986(1)(a); Copyright Act § 106(3).
"Copyright Act § 109.
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to the first public distribution of an authorized copy.70 After the creator's first
distribution, the usage rights of subsequent owners to sell or otherwise dispose
of the work are explicitly protected. The owner has an unqualified resale
right, not subject to the artist's continuing participation right. If the art-
proceeds right and the right to receive copyright protection were equivalent,
the subsequent owner would not have an unqualified resale right, but rather
would have a resale right qualified by the artist's right to share in resale pro-
fits.
Administrative Difficulties
Critics of art-proceeds legislation urge that it will be impossible to effec-
tively administer. Under the California Act upon sale of a work of fine art, a
seller with California citizenship, residing in Europe, is required to pay five
percent to the artist. The seller can easily avoid the law since the tracing pro-
blem will be so difficult. And since there is no art registration system in the
United States artists are usually unaware when one of their works is changing
ownership. The California Act can also be evaded if the parties to an art
transfer trasact outside California within the meaning of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. 71 Tracing the artist may also present problems. Many artists
are unaware of their rights under the California art-proceeds act and
therefore will not seek their five percent proceeds. Under the California Act,
"
5 Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect of transfer of particular copy or
phonorecord:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
Id. § 109(a).
"Under § 2-401 of the UCC, a sale takes place when title (ownership passes to the
buyer, i.e. when the seller "completes performance with respect to physical delivery of
the goods .. ."
Where and when title passes depends, in large part, upon the agreement be-
tween the buyer and the seller, or, as is usual with art works, the dealer. If the dealer
has agreed to deliver the work to an out-of-state buyer, then the transaction is known
as a "destination contract": title passes and the sale "takes place" out-of-state. If the
dealer agrees to deliver the work to a; third party, say cart and crate, within California
for shipment to an out-of-state buyer, this transaction is treated as a "shipment con-
tract": title passes and the sale "takes place" in California ....
The UCC, in § 1-102(3), gives the dealer and the buyer relatively wide leeway to
vary the impact of its provisions by agreement. It is possible that dealers and pur-
chasers would, in some instances, seek to take steps to make sure that a sale did not
"take place" in California. Because of the physical delivery principle of the UCC, there
is a substantial opportunity for the parties to the transaction to shape the sale to avoid
the royalty. If the facts are too baldly manipulated, however, and if there is no other
valid business reason for the agreement, a court may find that the parties have infring-
ed the rights of the artist.
M. Price & H. Sandison, A Guide to the Cahfornia Resale Royalties Act, 8, 9 (1976).
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for instance, if the seller or seller's agent cannot locate and pay the artist, the
California Arts Council is left with the difficult and expensive job of trying to
locate artists whose proceeds are waiting in the "Special Deposit Fund" to be
collected.
Most of the administrative difficulties of art-proceeds legislation would be
eliminated by the adoption of uniform legislation by the states. The tracing
problems may be solved by the creation of an agency-administered registra-
tion system for works of art;72 France has an efficient registration and collec-
tion system administered by SPADEM, 73 a national agency. In the United
States such an agency could function in a manner similar to ASCAP 7 4 and in
a short time institutionalize the practice of art registration and art-proceeds
collection. The system would establish a chain of title for the piece which
would benefit the artist by providing a record of each transfer of ownership.
It would also benefit the purchaser since a chain of title would probably in-
crease the value of the piece. 75 Enforcement under a uniform art-proceeds act
would not present significant obstacles, especially if the dollar amount of art-
proceeds earned is insubstantial, since it is unlikely many people would go to
great lengths to avoid paying it; procuring larger sums may require affir-
mative artist action. Although artists are not known for their business and
financial skills, 76 the resale benefits proferred by art-proceeds legislation
should encourage them to adopt such business practices as a personal registra-
tion system if necessary in order to collect their fair share. 77
As with any new legislation, it will take time to effectively implement a
national uniform act. The administrative difficulties which have arisen under
California's Act result from the fact that California is the only state having
such legislation and from novelty rather than inherent weaknesses of the
legislation. The California Arts Council is currently working out these pro-
'Rie, Legal Rights of the Artist, The Droit de Suite, 20 ART J. 152 (1961); The Legal
Rights of Artists (A Follow-Up), SO ART. J. 46 (1970).
'
3Societ6 de la Proprit Artistique et des Dessins et Modiles.
74See Boyers, Protection for the Artist: The Alternatives, 21 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
124, 145 (1974). The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers is a non-profit
association charged with the responsibility and duty of protecting the copyrighted compositions of
its members against infringement by illegal public performance for profit. ASCAP issues licenses
in behalf of its collective membership to all types of commercial amusement enterprises authoriz-
ing the performance for profit of copyrighted compositions. The organization collects the
royalties and the revenue from licenses. The expenses of operating ASCAP are deducted from
this license revenue. Artists could form a similar society which would organize a registration
system for works of art and collect art-proceeds. The revenue from a modest registration fee
could be used to defray the society's operating expenses.
75See Price & Strong, Discussion, Registration of Works of Art, in ART LAW 51 (L. Duboff
ed. 1975).
76Price, Artists' Property Rights, in ART LAw 41 (L. Duboff ed. 1975).
"This could be done through an agreement with the original purchaser that the artist is to
be notified in writing each time the work changes ownership, i.e., a transfer form. Each subse-
quent seller would be responsible for requiring his buyer to renegotiate a similar agreement with
the artist.
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cedural aspects.7 8 Overall, California is a state which is traditionally in the
forefront of the law and in the area of art-proceeds the California Act could
very well serve as model national uniform legislation for other states to adopt.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty of trying to fit the civil law concept of art-proceeds rights
into the American common law structure 9 should be overcome simply by
recognition of the need for this type of legislation. Without art-proceeds
legislation artists are not adequately protected. California has taken the in-
itiative to rectify this inequity but the legislation cannot be effective in isola-
tion; national uniformity is a necessity for efficient administration and en-
forcement. A National Uniform Art-Proceeds Act would provide the requisite
uniformity and thereby achieve the desirable goals which the California art-
proceeds act has attempted to secure.
ANN LOUISE STRAW
"9M. PRIcE AND H. SANDIsoN, A GUIDE TO THE CALIFORNIA RESALE ROYALTIES ACT 7-21
(1976).
TOSee Bross, Bross Muses While Art Burns, The Artist As Economic Man: Droit de Suite, in
ART LAW 54, 54-55 (L. Duboff ed. 1975).
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